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THE AFFAIR OF THE TJUMBOK TRAITORS 
Abdu11ah Arif 
Translation, introduction and annotation by Anthony Reid. 
Introduction 
in several ways Atjeh forms one extreme pole of Indonesian 
experience during the Revolution of 1945-9. It has been recognised 
officially as the one Indonesian province in which Dutch troops never 
set foot (ignoring the awkward detail of Sabang and other off-shore 
islands). But it has an even more distinctive place as the province' 
in which the 'social revolution' was most compl~te. The term 'social 
revolution' of course originated elsewhere, with the urban politicians 
trained in various schools of Marxism, for some of whom it meant the 
ideal but remote fulfilment of the revolution, for others a euphemism 
for violence at the expense of the privileged . The Atjehnese only 
learned to call their destruction of the aristocracy a 'social 
revolution' some time after it had occurred, and even then mainly 
for the sake of external appearances. They more frequently called 
it the 'Tjumbok war'. But within six months of the proclamation of 
independence they had eliminated from power, almost completely, not 
only the foreign elite but also the indigenous one. The pre-war elite, 
the uiee'ba'lanf! of aristocratic birth, complemented by a small urban 
Indonesian (as opposed to Atjehnese) intelligentsia, was replaced by 
a new elite of politically active uZama, religious leaders, comple-
mented by a new class of educated pemuda (youths). As a result of 
the Tjumbok affair ulamas occupied the position of bupati in most 
districts, and subsequently the predominant influence of another ulama, 
Daud Beureu'eh, was recognised by his appointment as military governor 
of the Province. A remarkable unity was forged in the Atjeh leader-
ship of 1946-8, but it was a unity based not on a Dutch education, but 
on an associat1on with the pre-war PUSA movement. 
As a class the tileebalangs of Atjeh were no more pro-Dutch 
than the aristocracy or bureaucracy of other parts of Indonesia. On 
the other hand their claim to political leadership had been very 
strongly challenged over the previous decade. The Dutch solution to 
the interminable Atjeh war had been to give the uleebalang class a 
stake in the colonial regime by bolstering their powers, whereas the 
ulamas came out of the war with no power but a heightened iinage as 
the embodiment of resistance to the Dutch. The old-fashioned ulama 
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ideal of resistance was clearly anachronist ic by the 1930s, but 
in the closing years of Dutch rule resentments against uleebalang 
power gave rise to a more modern ideal, articulated at first in 
the urban press, but increasingly through the mildly refonni st 
Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Atjeh (All-Atjeh religious teachers' 
a ssociation) or PUSA. Originally without political aims, its very 
success in uniting many of the most popularly influential ulamas 
made it a threat to the status quo . 
This threat became a reality at the Japanese invasion in 
1942, when PUSA provided the backbone of an anti-Dutch rebellion, 
in the expectation of being rewarded by the destruction of uleeba-
lang power at the hands of the Japanese . However the Japanese 
found it useful to keep the uleebalang-PUSA tension alive, and 
maintained uleebalang domination of the goverrunent, while depriving 
them of. ·'self-governing' st~tus and control of the judiciary. 
Tension between the two elites was high during the Japanese 
occupation, especially in the Pidie region, the centre of PUSA 
strength . After the Japanese surrender the widespread expectation 
of a rapid Dutch return encouraged the uleebal angs of Pidie to 
make contact with former Dutch officials in detention camps, in 
the hope that all their pre-war authority would be restored . 
Teuku Mohammad Daud Tjumbok took the lead in this movement, and 
his headstrong and uncompromising tactics quickly brought matters 
to a head, as described in Abdullah Arif's narrative . 
The great merit of this narrative is its immediacy. 
Published serially in Semangat Merdeka between 23 January and 
6 February, it was written within a few weeks of the events 
described. In April 1946 it was reprinted as a pamphlet, with a 
new preface and conclusion. The only other detailed accounts of 
the Tjumbok affair known to me are factually based on that of 
Abdullah. These are an Atjeh Goverrunent publication, Revolusi 
December '45 di Atjeh atau Pembasmian Pengchianat Tanah Air 
(Kutaradja, 1946), reproduced in the Kementerian Penerangan 
volume Propinsi Sumatera Utara (1953), pp. 64-75, and the 
unpublished Dutch intelligence report, 'Verslag van de gebeurten-
issen in de Afdeling Pidie, die leidden tot het Verdwijnen van 
het Gezag der Oeleebalangs in dat gedeelte van Atjeh (het s.g. 
"Tjoemboconflict")', 18 April 1946, bundle 21/9, in the post-war 
Indonesia archive of the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken. The 
closeness of the latter to Abdullah's account, despite the 
diametrically opposite bias, is a testimony to the latter's 
importance as a source . 
Abdullah made no clain to objectivity. He was wholly 
committed to the anti-uleebalang struggle, not only by his 
prominence in PUSA but also through the death of his brother in 
an early Tjumbok sortie. His purpose was primarily propagandistic. 
Yet he was too close to the events to have mythologised the whole 
struggle, and some of the nobility on the Tjumbok side still appears 
in his account, in contrast to later ones. Even the passage of a 
month or two between the writing of the original narrative and the 
Preface and Conclusion of the March pamphlet produced an interesting 
change. Whereas the earlier writing suggests a civil war against 
the 'traitorous' Tjumbok group, the latter shifts the emphasis to 
a 'social revolution' against the tyrannical upper class. The change 
is understandable. In the interval not only had the Pidie uleebalangs 
who had sided with Tjumbok been executed, but almost all the other 
uleebalangs of North and East Atjeh and Atjeh Besar had been 
imprisoned or at least deprived of their functions. Moreover the 
'social revolution' against the rulers in East Sumatra from 5 March 
had given added legitimacy to the populist ideas gradually spreading 
outward from educated pemuda circles in Kutaradja and Langsa. 
Abdullah Arif (1922-1970) (1) 
The writer of this narrative was very much a part of that 
strong Atjehnese tradition of rural Islamic scholarship which had 
provided the heart of Atjehnese resistance to Dutch rule since the 
1880s. His father, Teungku Muhammad Arif, was a religious teacher 
descended from a prominent line of such teachers associated with 
the deah (religious school) of Lamgut (Atjeh Besar). Muhammad Arif 
was among the last of the ulama to hold out against the Dutch in the 
remote Tangse area. Captured about 1910, he was imprisoned for 
four years. 
As was inevitable for one in his position, Abdullah had all 
his post-primary education in private Islamic schools. However he 
was fortunate in attending the Perguruan Islam of Teungku Abdul Wahab 
(see p.53) in Seulimeum, which in the 1930s was one of the most 
progressive in terms of methods and curriculum. Influenced by one 
of his teachers there, Aly Hasjmy, he began writing some poetry for 
newspapers. Shortly before the war Abdullah also attended the Sekolah 
Normal Islam at Bireuen which PUSA had established in December 1939 
1. This information is derived primarily from Abdullah's widow Aminah, 
and from the commemorative article in Sinar Darussalam, 21, 1970, 
pp. 59-62. 
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as the apex of Islamic education in Atjeh. Naturally he joined 
Pemuda PUSA, and ultimately became one of its principal leader s. 
Abdullah's career as a journalist began under the auspices 
of his former teacher Aly Hasjmy, first in the Atjeh Sinbun (1943-45) 
and then in the first Republican newspaper in Atjeh, Semangat Merdeka 
(1945-50) . He later transferred to the Ministry of Information in 
Djakarta (1951-60), before returning to Atjeh in 1960 to help estab-
lish the new university-level Institut Agama Islam Negeri Djami'ah 
Ar'Raniry there . While on the campus as an administrator he obtained 
a degree (1965) from the same institution, and went on to Al-Azhar 
in Cairo where he obtained distinction in his M.A. (1968), special-
izing in Da'wah (evangelization). An excellent linguist, he had 
taken the prize for speech in Arabic at the first PUSA Congress in 
1940, and was sent to Bukittinggi in 1944 for an intensive course 
in Japanese. Later he mastered English while on a Colombo Plan 
scholarship in Canada (1953). 
The main and lasting distinction of Abdullah Arif lies in 
the field of Atjehnese popular verse. He grew up in the tradition 
of the Atjehnese four-line sja'ir, modelled originally on the Arabic 
form, and much used by religious teachers for pedagogic purposes. 
Some ulamas had sought to reach a wider audience through the sja'ir 
for the urgent political purposes of the day. The Hikajat Perang 
Sabi!, composed by Teungku Tjhik Pante Kulu in the 1880s to inspire 
Atjehnese youngsters to sacrifice their lives in the war against 
the Dutch, was only the most famous example. Many such sja 'ir were 
read aloud in the village meunassah (prayer-hall) where the young 
men slept, and they often dealt with contemporary events and person-
alities with relevance and wit. (2) 
Abdullah's best writing should be seen as part of this 
tradition, in response to the new crisis inaugurated by the procla-
mation of independence . True to his times, he used the roman 
alphabet, modified the traditional rhyme structure, and drew his 
analogies less from Arabic literature than from the heady discussion 
in educated Atjeh circles of national and international politics, 
revolution, and ideology. But the use of this popular verse form 
for inunediate political purposes was not new. Later a polemic 
developed through the medilDll of the sja ' ir. The anti-uleebalang 
2. See Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, (Leiden/London, 1906), II, 
pp. 100-120. 
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sja'irs of Abdullah and his colleagues Ibnu Abbas and Isma'il 
Muhammad were answered in the Suasana Atjeh series of 'Thusny-
Shah 1, published in Djakarta from 1950, and attacking the new 
PUSA domination of Atjeh. 
Abdullah Arif's output of sja'irs was tremendous, 
especially in the pamphlet series Seumangat Atjeh. Although 
the thirteenth and last volume of this series appeared in 1960, 
the majority of numbers were issued in 1945-6 and dealt with 
the development of the revolution. The new crisis of the Darul 
Islam rebellion in Atjeh prompted another three-volume series, 
Nasib Atjeh (1955?-58), as well as the goverrunent-connnissioned 
Sja'ir Kerukunan Ra'jat Atjeh (1962) to celebrate the end of the 
revolt. In Indonesian prose Abdullah was less successful. Most 
of his prose, like the Peristiwa Pengchianat Tjumbok, was written 
hastily for newspapers and lacked any literary pretensions. His 
only other separately published prose work was th~ commemorative 
volume Kongres Besar PUSA dan P. PUSA for the 1950 Congress of 
the organisation. 
Abdullah Arif died on 7 January 1970, as a result of a 
fall in his home. This translation may serve as a partial 
recognition of his place in Atjehnese writing. 
ANTHONY REID 
Canberra, December 1970. 
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Abbreviations used in the text 
Sadan Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Group). 
Barisan Pendjaga Keamanan (Peacekeeping Force) -
organised by Tjumbok. 
Kampong (village). 
Negara Republik Indonesia (State of the Republic 
of Indonesia). 
Pemuda Republik Indonesia (Youth of the Republic 
of Indonesia. 
Teuku - an honorific for members of uleebalang 
families. 
Teungku - a general honorific, applied especially 
to ulamas. 
Tentera Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Anny) -
the Republican armed force. 
36 
THE AFFAIR OF THE TJUMBOK TRA ITORS 
Abdullah Arif 
Pref ace 
The bloody clash in Pidie Region (Sigli, Lam Meulo, and 
Meureudu districts) (1) between the People's Forces and the 
uleebalangs who wanted to betray their people and Fatherland, is 
ended. The uleebalang group, who wanted to defend the right of 
force and feared the loss of their aristocratic crowns, quietly 
made contact with the enemy of the state, namely NICA,etc. The 
people who felt fully responsible for the security and independence 
of the fatherland, in a mighty wave of patriotic feeling, rose as 
one man to oppose the evil aims and intentions of those traitors, 
until the end result was a clash and terrible. bloodshed. 
The man who acted as leader of the traitors' forces was 
Tcuku M. Daud Tjumbok, aided by various other uleebalangs. It 
could be said that 99% of the uleebalangs of Pidie region were 
of one mind with Teuku Tjumbok in wanting to destroy the indepen-
dence of N. R.I. ()) But thanks to the struggle of the people who 
were united in opposing the plans of those despicable traitors, the 
claws of tyTanny were broken, and the hopes of these criminals who 
opposed freedom were foiled . 
As a man who wanted to avenge the death of his elder 
brother, who was killed by a bullet from the Tjumbok party, I left 
rey duties in Kutaradja to go to the cauldron of the battlefield, 
and strapped on my kZewang [sabreJ to crush the Tjumbok party and 
its followers. I adyanced with the People's Forces and fought 
with two aspirations, freedom or martyTdom. Apparently the time 
of my death had not yet come, and although I was once surrounded 
and chased by the traitors' forces, I was ahle to continue the 
struggle up to the moment we managed to enter the Tjumbok fortress 
which was then open. 
As soon as the fighting was over and Teuku Tjumbok had 
surrendered, I immediately returned to Kutaradja to contirwe my 
duties as a journalist with Semangat Merdeka. In Semangat Merdeka 
I told the story of the Tjumbok Affair right through from beginning 
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to end. The story was later also copied by various other dailies 
in Medan, such as Pewarta Deli, Mimbar Umum, and Utusan Sumatera 
(Padang), etc. In connection with many requests from the public, 
I put the story of the Tjwnbok Affair together again as a book 
with several changes but the same ba-sic form, and with additions 
artd omissions where they were thought necessary. (3) 
The whole of my story in this simple book has been written 
in accordance with my own knowledge of the Tjwnbok Affair. Never-
theless, this composition is still in the nature of a narrative 
based on first impressions; in other words, I have written it in 
accordance with what I have heard and seen in the course of .the 
fighting. 
For all the many shortcomings which undoubtedly exist 
in this small book I ask humble pardon. Moreover, I especially 
hope that my mistakes will be criticised honestly by my wise 
readers. With the saying 'there is no ivory tusk without a crack', 
I place this book in the lap of its readers. 
Abdullah Arif 
Kutaradja, March 1946. 
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The Causes of the Tjumbok Affair 
To understand the causes which gave rise to the sensational 
Tjwnbok affair, we must first clarify · briefly the situation since 
Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces, because that affair was more 
or less connected with the Japanese defeat in the recently concluded 
Greater East Asia War. 
The account which we set out here is based on the account 
of Teuku Tjumbok Daud himself (when we met him before the affair 
occurred), and also from the notes of the traitors themselves which 
we obtained after their def eat at the hands of the people, as also 
from other accounts. 
On 14 August, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces, 
and with that the feeling of Indonesian Independence was in the air, 
from the city to the villages. On 17 August,1945 the Proclama:tion 
of Indonesian Independence was announced to ~he world by Sukarno-
Hatta. Everywhere you could hear people discussing the question 
of the independence of the Fatherland. The Merah-Putih [red and 
white flag] was flown everywhere. The appointment of the leading 
goverrunent officials was announced to every section of the community. 
B.P.I. branches were fanned everywhere, which later became P.R.I. 
(now Pesindo). (4) The attention of all pemudas was concentrated 
on this centre of power. 
At that time (5) we visited North Atjeh, and went to Lam 
Meulo on the business of our newspaper, Semangat Merdeka. In Lam 
Meulo we had the opportunity to meet Teuku Daud Tjumbok (6) and 
to explain in full what had happened in connection with publicising 
the independence of our Fatherland. During this conversation it 
seemed to us that Teuku Tjumbok was doubtful and disdainful of the 
movement to support the independence of our Fatherland, Indonesia. 
According to his view, we Indonesians were not yet capable of 
independence, because we were not mature, and the Dutch would 
undoubtedly return to Indonesia as quickly a£ possible to govern us. 
\~1ile we were conversing, a telegram arrived from the 
Resident of Atjeh, N.R.I., announcing that Indonesia was independent, 
and requesting that the red and white flag be flown in the Lam Meulo 
district to celebrate our independence. Teuku Tjumbok laughed at 
the telegram and crumpled it up. 
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At every street corner in the town of Lam Meulo, B.P.I . 
pemudas put up announcements and notices about Indonesian Indepen-
dence. Teuku Tjumbok ordered his men to tear down all these 
announcements and broadsheets. When a ceremony to hoist the Merah-
Putih and public meetings were held in Lam Meulo, Teuku Tjumbok 
was never there; (7) moreover; all efforts to spread the ideal of 
Independence were forcefully impeded. People who wore the red and 
white insignia were ridiculed and laughed at in public. 
On 12 October, 1945, the popular forces hoisted the red 
and white flag at the office of the Guntjo (8) of Lam Meulo. As 
soon as this was known to Teuku Daud Tjumbok, he immediately ordered 
that the flag be pulled down. Since he was the Guntjo and the 
person responsible for that office, the flag had to be taken down : 
by his subordinate. 
At the same time, by various means and all sorts of 
bribery, Teuku Tjumbok tried to get possession of all the Japanese 
weapons in the Lam Meulo district. According to what his son 
(Teuku M. Hasan) told us, the Japanese had handed over more than . 
a hundred guns of various kinds including cannons, mortars, and so 
forth, and a large quantity of ammunition. In Lam Meulo district 
there were a large number of storehouses for Japanese arms, as well 
as for foodstuffs, clothing, petrol, and so forth. It could be 
said that in the whole Pidie region this district had the largest 
Japanese stores, and Teuku Daud as Guntjo could easily get hold of 
these. 
Making Contact with NICA 
Besides not respecting the proclamations of the Republican 
Government, Teuku Daud Tjumbok quietly made secret contact with 
NICA agents who at that time were wandering about everywhere. 
T. Daud Tjumbok also sent f.5000 in cash and two ka.ju of cloth with 
one of his men to the former Dutch Controleur of Lam Meulo. (9) 
Many former Dutch soldiers were rounded up and ordered to 
teach his men how to use firearms, such as rifles, machine guns, 
cannons, and so forth. At the same time, several of his agents made 
propaganda in the villages to the effect that Teuku Tjumbok had 
received authorisation from the Col!Dllander of the British Forces in 
Java to establish his own army in Lam Meulo, although this was 
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purely to influence simple-minded people to join his army and 
become his followers. 
With this sort of thing going· on, the position of the 
T .K.R. (10) in Lam Meulo district was naturally very .much 
disturbed, particularly when they received violent threats from 
the party of Teuku Daud Tjumbok. 
Three Historic Shots 
The Tjumbok party and its followers continued their train-
ing in the use of weapons. Meanwhile1 an incident (riot) occurred in Sigli town, which involved a violent clash and considerable 
bloodshed. 
This incident was caused by the perverted Japanese policy 
which sought to delay the surrender of weapons which had already 
been promised to the N.R.I. Goverrunent and was to take place at a 
public rally. All the inhabitants, both from the town and from 
distant villages, came down to Sigli to witness the handing over 
of these Japanese weapons. From the side of the uleebalangs of 
Pidie region there arose the suspicion that the masses wanted to 
seize these weapons for their own purposes, with the result that 
the uleebalangs too wanted to get in before the people, and hoped 
that the weapons would be given to them. 
Just as the situation was becoming tense, with the masses 
flooding into the town without regard to the threat to their lives, 
the first explosions were heard of three successive shots fired into 
the crowd from the house of Teuku Pakeh Sulaiman, the uleebalang of 
Pidie. This occurred at 3.30 p.m. on 4 December;1945. 
This was followed by machine-gun fire and rifle fire from 
the very centre of the town . The crowd possessed only one or two 
rifles, while the other side had and used cannons fmeria:m kodok], 
machine guns, rifles, hand grenades and so forth, even though these 
dangerous weapons were in large part Government property. The only 
aim of the mass of people was to escape after the first terrifying 
shots rang out. (11) 
Several pemudas and prominent people in Sigli, together 
with the Japanese, tried to restore the situation and make peace. 
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Thanks to the activity of these pemudas and cooperation from a T.K.R. 
unit newly arTived from Kutaradja, the bloodshed was finally stopped, 
after taking a considerable number of lives, most of them innocent 
people. On the day of this incident,T . Banta Sjam Q.2) of Peudaja, 
Padang Tidji ( a pemuda whose name is no longer unfamiliar in 
progressive Atjeh circles) died as a hero after being hit by a bullet 
from the side of the traitors of the Fatherland. 
A cause for great regret in this affair was that a very 
large number of weapons belonging to the N.R.I. were seized by the 
group of traitors in order to kill the people; moreover, a section 
of the Sigli T.K.R. itself was influenced by them. Finally, this 
section of the T.K.R. openly sided with the traitors, forgetting 
their solemn duty and disregarding their position as guardians of , 
the safety of the people. Their action undoubtedly violated their 
military regulations, and there is no question that they were 
deceived in giving support to the traitors of their country and 
their people. 
Tjumbok forms the B.P.K. (Barisan Pendjaga Keamanan [Peacekeeping . 
Force] ) 
The fighting in Sigli ended on 6 December, 1945. The weapons 
remained under the control of the N.R.I . Government. The people 
left the town and returned to their respective villages. Meanwhile 
• I T. Pakeh SulalJDan fled to Lueng Putu. 
Then on 10 Decembe~1945, (13) all the uleebalangs in the 
three districts of Pidie Region, i.e.1 Sigli, Lam Meulo, and Meureudu, 
were invited to confer at Lueng Putu, at the house of T. Laksamana 
Oemar. (14) At this meeting it was decided to form a tightly 
disciplined military organisation, which had no connection whatever 
with the T.K.R. Among other things it was also decided at that 
meeting: 
I To form and organise in each son (nanggrou, or uleebalang-
ship) three forces, i.e.: 
(a) Barisan Tjap Rintang ['star' unit]; its task was to 
make war on people who refused to submit to them. 
0>) Barisan Tjap Sauh f •anchor' unit]; its task was to 
steal people's property for the needs of the B.P.K., 
and to burn the houses of people who resisted. 
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(c) Barisan Tjap Tombak [ 1 spear 1 unit]; its task was to 
seize all the educated and able people to be killed 
or slaughtered, and to kidnap people's wives and 
daughters. (15) 
II To join the war on the side of the Dutch, killing the 
populace in order to obtain the status and position 
they held in the former period of Dutch imperialism. 
The above infonnation is merely what we picked out from 
those of their letters we obtained, and also from the accounts of 
prisoners. 
When the Tjumbok party was forced out by the People's 
Forces, we went to their headquarters in Lam Meulo, and there we 
found the written oath of the B.P.K. army. We reproduce it as 
follows: 
CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, named ..... residing at ...... son [nanggrou] 
....• Lam Meulo district, of Indonesian ... race, a soldier of 
the Barisan Pendjaga Keamanan (B.P.K.) in Lam Meulo district, 
hereby swear I accept and respect the following: 
1 Loyalty to the protection of the leader. 
2 Respect and obedience for the commands of 
the leader and his deputies. 
3 Courage and bravery. 
4 Not to betray the Barisan Pendjaga Keamanan . 
Sincerity and honesty in carrying out my duty. 
5 Not to enter any organisation without the 
knowledge of the leader. 
Lam Meulo .•... Nov. 1945. 
I who swear 
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The Tjumbok party consolidates its defence 
Then the B.P.K. army which was formed in the three districts 
was strengthened. Training continued energetically. At Yarious key 
points strong defensive works were built. The central headquarters 
were at Lam Meulo, while branches were established at Meureudu, Lueng 
Putu, GllUilpang Pajong, Beureunun, Bambi, le Leubeue, Gigieng, Pulo le, 
Samaindra and elsewhere. 
The 'Anchor' Unit begins to act. People's property is stolen and looted. 
The first action of Teuku Daud TjlUilbok's 'Anchor' unit was 
to loot the Pesindo off ice and seize all the letters and property in 
that office. Pemudas who were Pesindo members, and especially leaders, 
were chased out and shot, until it became impossible for the Lam Meulo 
Pesindo branch to carry out its task. Pesindo pemudas who happened 
to get arrested were beaten until they were half-dead, tormented, and 
tortured, and there were even some who were killed or shot dead. 
There was looting of the houses of Pesindo executives . . On 
the night of 10 December,194~ Tgk.Zainal Abidin and Hassan Muhammad, 
a relation of Tgk.Umar Tiro (16) (respectively Treasurer and President 
of the Lam Meulo Pesindo branch) had their houses looted. Goods to 
the value of f .240,335 (clothing and gold ornaments) were stolen. In 
this robbery one Pesindo member was killed and another seriously 
wounded. 
The following evening these brigands looted in karnpung Lam 
Udjong. Goods to the value of f.26,711 were stolen from the house of 
Tgk.Sulaiman (head of the Pesindo security organisation in Lam Meulo), 
arid to the value of f.56,080 from the house of Tgk.Bendadeh- all these 
valued in terms of the former currency rate. 
TjlUilbok opposes the instructions of the N.R.I. Government 
Teuku Daud Tjwnbok's hostile attitude to the instructions 
and proclamations of the N.R.I. Government was not hidden; on the 
contrarr, those proclamations were ridiculed in the most open manner. 
To make that intransigent attitude clear, a fair was held 
in Lam Meulo where permission was given to gamble under the protection 
44 
of his armed brigands. When the Resident of Atjeh issued his pro-
clamation forbidding anything which interfered with the econanic 
well -being of the people, such as gambling, etcetera, Teuku Tjtunbok 
extended his fair for several days, until the town of Lam Meulo 
resembled one huge casino. In acting thus, Teuku Daud Tjumbok said 
to his friends, ' I'd just like to see .who has the courage to stop 
me'. 
Meanwhile, the roads leading into Lam Meulo were fortified 
with help from the uleebalangs in the Pidie region, because he 
believed the Government in Kutaradja was going to send envoys and a 
military force to Lam Meulo to take away the arms in his possession. 
Attempts to Seize Ulamas 
After the Sigli affair which ended in such an unsatisfact ory 
peace, the Tjumbok party used the Imeums and Keutjhiks (17) to spread 
propaganda that the affair in Sigli had ended in a victory for 
Tjumbok and his party. All the arms had now fallen under his cont rol. 
Now T. Daud Tjumbok conceived the idea of having a feast at 
his house in Lam Meulo . The ulamas of his district and prominent 
figures among the people would be invited. The day of this feast 
coincided with the date of the fair, which was held within the grounds 
of his house. One or two ulamas who were unaware of his evil purposes 
attended, notably Tgk. Hadjat (former Kali of Lam Meulo district) (18) 
and people of similar outlook. The other ulamas appeared already to 
understand Teuku Tjwnbok's perverted intentions, so that a very large 
nwnber stayed away. To the two or three ulamas who came Teuku Daud 
Tjumbok said : ' In due course I will repent so as to earn God's 
mercy like you Teungkus, but let it be after this fair, and let us 
first have our fill of the good things of this world'. And with 
that he raised his glass of liquor and invited the ulamas to drink 
with him. 
Teuku Daud hoped thereby to lower the status of the ulamas, 
and ridicule them in front of everybody. Natural!~ his invitation 
was refused by the ulamas, and Teuku Tjumbok proceeded to get drunk 
with his friends who drank with him. 
Two days after this occurrence, an instruction came from 
Teuku Oaud Tjurobok to arrest all the ulamas and educated people who 
had not come to his feast. At the time the 'Anchor' unit acted to 
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carry out its task, none of the people whose arrest had been ordered 
remained in their houses. All had previously left their villages 
and had guessed that the arrests would take place . Among those ulamas 
many moved to Garut, like the family of Tgk. Umar Tirot Tgk. Sjech A. 
Kadir Kampung Langga and others, so that all those ulamas were out of 
danger. Two or three youths who were captured were beaten and ill-
treated, and then decapitated .... 
Ill- treatment of the General Population 
As had been the habit of the ZeZfbestuu.rders (autonomous 
rulers) in North Atjeh in the old Dutch period, so now these people 
with the coming of independence wanted to retrace their steps by 
violating all the rights and property of the people. They believed 
that the special right given them by the Dutch to judge the people 
according to their fancy was now again in their hands, so that with-
out furt~er ado they took action to seize again the property that 
had been returned to the people during the Japanese r6gime. The 
contents of the treasury which were properly the right and property 
of the state were seized or embezzled by them, because they thought 
they had better rights to that property. 
The people were ordered to each bring a piece of bamboo 
and a bundle of cane hemp to make a fence around the house. Whoever 
broke this command was arrested and punished severely, because he 
had broken the conunand of an uleebalang. 
One resident. of Lam Meulo district was beaten severely on 
Tjumbok's instructions, which caused him to become deaf, and was 
imprisoned for several days, because he was accused of having been 
brave enough to demand a gift of rice from the rice stored up at 
the time of the Japanese Government, whereas these gifts had already 
been embezzled by Teuku Tjumbok himself. One pemuda in Lam Meulo 
district was so mistreated that his eyes were damaged, because he 
was accused of having taken care of a female relation who had been 
ill-treated by the Tjumbok family . A girl was preparing to be married 
to a youth in Kampong Tjot Murong, when suddenly sane relations of 
Tjumbok came to her parents' house and threatened that the girl could 
not marry anyone except a member of the family of Tjumbok himself; 
otherwise the house would be burned. 
If we described all the cruelties connected with the Tjumbok 
affair, it would certainly take up a great deal of space. 
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Samaindra attacks Garut 
Garut was the site of the Pu.sat Markas Rakjat [Central 
People's Headquarters] in this affair, (19) and various plans were 
being made in Garut to resist the threats to the people made by the 
group of traitors. Garut is 8 km. from Sigli. 
l3ccause Garut lay withing the authority of the Uleebalang 
of Sarnaindra, (20) Tjumbok instructed that it must be he who 
destroyed the Markas Rakjat situated in Garut. On 11 December,1945, 
Samaindra suddenly attacked Garut at 5 o'clock in the morning. This 
attack was interrupted because Teuku Tjhik M. Said (21) arrived from 
Sigli to settle the dispute. But the peace made by T .M. Said was 
a very lame peace. 
As soon as Samaindra withdrew, Garut strengthened its 
<lefenscs and prepared to resist the coming attacks. 
:_r.jumbok attacks Me Tareuem 
After plundering and looting various houses of Pesindo 
leaders around Lam Meulo, the Tjumbok party made its first attack 
on the mukim i·le Tarcuem on 16th December, 1945, at 4 p.m. 
Me Tareuem lies 7 km. from Lam Meulo, and this village 
became the centre of pemuda strength in the Lam Meulo district. 
It was also the site of the only properly organised religious school 
in that district. For that reason. the Tjumbok party began its attacks 
there, \tith the result that a great deal of damage and loss was 
suffered by the inhabitants, who had absolutely no knowledge of the 
issues involved. 
After that action the people were quiescent, and took no 
action \·1hatcver against the Tjumbok party, which attacked at will. 
They only reported the incident to the authorities, and to the 
Assistant-Resident of North Atjeh, who resided in Sigli. The matter 
was investigated by Teuku Tjhik M. Said (Asst. Resident North Atjeh), 
who came at once with some military officers to inspect Me Tareuem. 
After seing the ruins, and the damage caused by Tjumbok's attack, 
T . t·L Sa.id \·1ent on to Lam Meulo and held a discussion with Teuku Daud 
Tjumbok himself. 
The following day T .M . Said informed the victims of the 
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attack on Me Tareuem that the Tjumbok party had absolutely no 
intention of purposely attacking Me Tareuem; it was only a training 
exercise. The people should remain calm and should take no action 
in the matter. 
It was obvious that the people could not be satisfied, and 
suspected something going on behind this peace-making. This was 
one of the reasons which brought T.M. Said himself into mortal 
danger. It appears also from other sources of information that 
T.M. Said had joined the supporters of the Tjumbok conspiracy. (22) 
The Popular Forces launch a counterattack 
Unable to tolerate these continual attacks by the Tjumbok I 
party, the People established a command to organise counter-attacks 
~gainst the savage Tjumbok paTty. The Pusat Ma:r>kas Ba:r>isan Rakjat 
[Headquarters of the People's Forces] (23) was situated at Garut, 
while ·small offices were set up at places which were considered 
important, such as Gle Gapui (Me Tareuem), Gigieng, Ie Labeue and 
various other places . 
The top leadership of the Markas Rakjat was headed by Hasan 
Aly (24), assisted by other ulamas and pemudas from the whole Pidie 
region, such as Tgk. Banta, Peutua Husin Sanggeue, etcetera. The 
2osition of Tgk. Umar Tiro in this war was as PangZi.rna Perang 
LconunanderJ, who at the same time advised the top leadership of the 
Markas Rakjat. (Tgk. Umar Tiro is the grandson of Tgk.Tjhik di 
Tiro whose name is illustrious from the Holy War. When Tjwnbok 
ordered his men to arrest all the ulamas, Tgk.Urnar moved to Garut 
to work out plans for a counter-attack). When T.M. Amin (25) 
returned from Kutaradja to throw himself into the fight, the Markas 
Rakjat appo~nted him and Tgk. H. Mustafa as an advisory board for 
the command. At first, the post at Gle Gapui was led by Hasan Aly 
himself, but later it was entrusted to the pemuda M. Hasbal lah 
Daud (son of Tgk.M. Daud Beureueh). The Gigieng post was led by 
Husin Sab,assisted by Sab Tjut and other pemudas. The le Labeue 
post was led by r.t. Husin,assisted by his friends. 
Once all the people's forces which flocked from all 
directions had been gathered together, on the night of 24 December, 
1945, a counterattack was launched against the Tjumbok party, which 
startled Tjumbok because it came · so suddenly. 
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Tjumbok conducts a scorched-earth policy 
After suffering the losses and casualties caused by this 
counterattack by the people, Tjumbok realized for the .first time 
that the people's spirit was not broken by the attacks of his 'Star' 
unit, as he had originally hoped. On t .he contrary, the attitude of 
the people, both men and women, was becoming steadily more angry 
towards the group of traitors themselves. 
Once it was clear that the spirit of the people could 
absolutely not be broken by those wild attacks, the Tjtunbok party 
conducted an even crueller campaign , of attacking the people on a 
large scale, and setting the 'Anchor' unit to steal all the contents 
of villages which had been deserted by their inhabitants. Light 
things were carried off, while heavy things were wrecked. Water 
buffaloes, cows, chickens, ducks, etcetera, were carried off to be 
eaten by their soldiers. After that,he commanded that all the 
houses which had been deserted be burned. 
An operation such as we have described was first carried 
out by Tjumbok on 3Q December;1945, accompanied by cannon, machine-
gun, and rifle fire in the direction of Kp. Langga. In the course 
of that wild attack, Tjtnnbok made his camp at Kp. Suwiek (Samaindra), 
and a very heavy attack was directed at Gle Gapui, because there 
many people sided with the People's .Forces. 
During the Tjumbok party's bombardment of Kampung Langga, 
one shell fell right on the office of the Kp. Langga Pesindo branch, 
with the result that M. Ali Arif (elder brother of A. Arify)., (26) 
the head of the Pesindo branch there, died as a martyr [sjahid] in 
the course of duty. Others of his friends were seriously wounded. 
The following day, 31 December, .1945, the Tjumbok party 
continued its onslaught to Me Tareuem and the Yillages around it. 
At that time the People's Forces had only a few rifles. Thus the 
defences of the Me Tareuem people were breached, and the Tjumbok 
Party could attack that village itself. The 'Anchor' unit proceeded 
to carry out its task, looting and stealing all the property of the 
people in the place. Finall~Me Tareuem was burned to the ground, 
includ~ng the house of Tgk. H. Ibrahim. 
It was the uleebalang of Me Tareuem himself who pointed 
out which houses should be burned> that is, the houses of the Pesindo 
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and T.K.R. pemudas. But as the result of a mistake, that uleebalang's 
own house was also burned. 
As each village was burned, the building which was singled 
out espeically was the former Ku Boin, (27) after that the religious 
school~and finally the ordinary houses. 
After the burning of Me Tareuem,the inhabitants had to drift 
about from place to place, because they had no place to shelter. At 
the village of Me Tareuem alone, a total of about SO houses and 10 
other buildings were burned, including the youths' office and the 
supply of books for the religious school. 
Besides Me Tareuem, !lot, Lagang, Pulo Kameng, and other , 
places were burned. The building of the Titeue religious school was 
completely razed. (28) Along the railway line between Sigli and 
Lhokseumawe several more villages suffered from this scorched-earth 
policy .. 
One of the cruelties of the 'Anchor' unit in the course 
of these burnings affected some women who were sheltering in a hole·, 
and were buried under the burning houses. A total of 5 people were 
burned in this way . One elderly woman was beaten and whipped, then 
tied to the upright of a house. Then the house was burned, and the 
elderly woman was burned with it. 
What we have described here is only an outline of what 
happened. 
The Barisan Mati [Death Unit] from Tangse and Peudaja 
Among the units which joined the attack to smash the Tjumbok 
stronghold,. we give a special word of praise and thanks to the Barisan 
Mati from Tangse and Peudaja, which gave its utmost in the struggle 
to wipe out ·the party of the traitor to the Fatherland. 
The Tangse unit was led by Tgk. Sjech Daud Tangse, and it 
was this unit which stopped the Tjumbok party as it was rapidly 
advancing to burn Garut and Aree on the day of the burning of Me 
Tareueni. The Peudaja unit fought under the leadership of the pemuda 
M. Djuned Effendi. From the time of the Sigli affair right up to 
the Tjumbok affair
1 
this unit was renowned as the crack unit which 
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didn't know the meaning of death. Several pemudas from these two 
units died nobly, struck by the bullets of the hypocrites. Never-
theless,. their sacrifice will be a model for other youths in the 
larger field of struggle. 
A Letter from the Battlefield 
As the war raged violently between the two sides, there 
were signs indicating that the Tjumbok party's resistance was 
beginning to slacken; but to hide his weakness Teuku Daud Tjumbok 
threw a letter out into the middle of the battlefield, designed 
to intimidate the common people into not continuing the fight The 
letter was found in the middle of the battlefield, and was addressed 
to Tgk. Sjech Daud, commander of the popular forces from Tangse. 
The letter read as follows: 
Lam Meulo 1 Jan. 1946 
We give notice! 
If you, and the Tangse people who are of your opinion, 
have not yet been brought to your senses by the losses of 
the last few days, and still want to fight with us as men, 
don't defend yourselves in the villages, for to do so will 
result in many villagers who are not guilty becoming 
involved in the confusion. For this reason we hereby give 
you an opportunity -- build your strongholds outside the 
villages, in places you consider strong enough. When your 
defences are complete, check once more whether those 
defences are strong enough, in your estimation. Then inform 
us so that we may come to attack. 
Remember! 
We are fully prepared to come to attack and eliminate 
the two or three principal traitors who always make a lot 
of noise to lead the common people astray. For this reason, 
as a reminder, understand the meaning of your past actions 
and read the text of this letter in front of the people of 
Tangse who are of your opinion . 
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Remember the victims who have already fallen! 
To Sjech Daud 
of Tangse 
We, the leader of the 
Uleebalang Headquarters, 
T.M. Daud 
Assistance from every element in the population 
At the time the war, and the fighting was waging furiously 
between the two sides, help came like a flood from every class of 
people, not only from the inhabitants of Pidie region, but also 
from Atjeh Besar, North Atjeh, the Gayo country, West Atjeh and 
elsewhere. All of them were ready with their forces to smash the 
Tjumbok traitors' party which was rampaging so wildly. 
Before the popular forces advanced to the battlefield, they 
were first advised as followers by the Markas Rakjat: 
Brother Muslims! 
Our present struggle is to wipe out all crime and 
treachery to the Fatherland. For that reason we hope 
that such crime will not arise on our side: 
1. Do not burn houses, whoever they belong to. 
2. Do not take private property, even if it is of 
no value. 
3. All those taken prisoner must be treated well. 
4. Refrain absolutely from striking a wounded enemy, 
for God will not help those who are cruel, and 
will not receive their prayers. 
That is all! 
After receiving advice of this sort, the popular forces 
began the attack to crush the traitors, with a strong determination 
to win or find martydom as victims of the struggle. 
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An Ultimatum from the NRI Government to Tjumbok 
After the appearance of an article in the daily Semangat 
Merdeka,which explained all the possibilities to which the Tjumbok 
affair could give rise, and urged the Mark.as lJrrrum (29) and the 
N.R.I. Government of Atj eh to take decisive action against the 
Tjumbok party because of its continued cruelty in North Atjeh, on 
8 January the Markas lhnum of Atjeh duly held a special meeting, and 
at that meeting decided to adopt a concrete approach towards the 
traitorous Tjumbok party. Besides sending a force of Special 
Police · (30) and T.K.R. from Kutaradja, the N.R.I. Government of 
Atjeh issued an ultimatum to the Tjumbok party. We reproduce the 
text of the ultimatum in full as follows: 
Ultimatum 
The group centred in Tjumbok, Lam Meulo, and other 
places , who are armed and are opposing the People, are 
hereby informed they must surrender and cease their 
opposition, at 12 noon on Thursday 10 January, 1946. 
If they are unwilling to surrender and cease 
their opposition, they will be humbled by force. 
On behalf of the Markas Umum of Atjeh, 
Sjamaun Gaharu, chairman. 
On behalf of the Government of Atjeh, 
T.P.P. Muhd. Ali, 
Deputy Resident of Atjeh N.R.I. (31) 
Assistance from Seulimeum 
After the Markas Umum and the N.R.I . Government of Atjeh 
had made a clear decision to fight the Tjumbok farty, which ha4 
committed treason, a force of pemudas from Seuhmeum arrived 
together with the Government anny, anxious to take part in the 
struggle because of their own desire to wipe out Tjumbok and his 
followers. In fact,before that force set out, some pemudas from 
Seulimeum and Montasie' had already arrived earlier, and they 
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fought fiercely with great bravery in the very front line. 
The force from Seulimeum. fully equipped with modern 
weapons. arTived at the field of battle on J.2 January,J.946. and 
immediately launched a fierce attack on the Tjumbok fortifications 
with l~rge cannons. 
Tgk. A. Wahab Seulimeum 
At the time the fighting was in progress on a great scale 
in Meureudu district and round about. where the Tjumbok pa.rt.y and 
followers were behaving so wildly and cruelly. Tgk. Abdul Wahab 
Seulimeum suddenly arrived in Bireuen on his return journey from 
the Congress of the Madjtis Istam Tinggi which had just taken 
place in Bukittinggi. (~2) When he arrived in Bir.euen. the inhabi-
tants of Peusangan. comprising every class of the people. were 
prepari~g to help fight Tjumbok in Pidie. Thus, with unanimous 
agreement1 Tgk. Abdul Wahab was chosen the overall leader of the 
Markas Rakjat from Peusangan. assisted by Tgk. M. Nur El Ibrahimy, 
Tgk. Abdur Rahman Glumpang Dua, Tgk. Sjech A. Hamid Djeunib. 
T.H. Zainuddin Samalanga. Hasballah and others. (33) 
This People's Force from North Atj eh, after wiping out 
the traitors who had made their nest in the Meureudu district, 
Lueng Putu and the surrounding area. went on to attack the £orti-
fication of Teuku Keumangan at Beureunun. (~4) Tjumbok gave great 
help to defend this strong fortification, but because it was 
pounded from the east and the west by th.e People's Forces, the 
fortification finally fell on J.2 January, J.946, bringing a great 
loss to the side of the Tjumbok party. 
The Fortress of Lam Meulo falls 
After the fall of the Beureunun fortification, Tjumbok 
felt that his foundations were already crumbling, but,nevertheless, 
the traitor continued to offer an extremely strong resistance with 
all the forces at his disposal. The reinforcements sent by the 
Goverrunent from Kutaradja waited for the Tjumbok party to raise the 
white flag and surrender to them, but the ultimatum which was sent 
by the G·overnment was totally disregarded by Tjumbok. What is more, 
after the ultimatum was sent their onslaught became even Eore 
intense. 
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On 12 January the Peo~le's Forces launched a very heavy 
simultaneous attack from four Lsic] directions. The Seulimeum 
artillery attacked from Gle Gapui; the T.K.R., with the Special 
Police and the People's Forces from Nor~h Atjeh, ~rom Beureunun; 
and the unit of Tangse and Peudaja from Titeue. After fighting 
and exchanging fire with cannons, mortars and so forth from 
morning until dusk, it began to appear that Tjumbok's resistance 
was altogether broken, and the town of Lam Meulo was deserted by 
its inhabitants. Because it was already very dark, Lam Meulo 
town was not immediately occupied by the People's Forces that 
night, and they waited until the following day. In the meantime1 
Teuku Daud Tjumbok with the members of his staff left their 
fortress and houses, and fled to the jungle. The following day, 
when the People's Forces entered the Tjumbok fortress, there 
were only women and ordinary people to be found, together with 
a quantity of arms which had been wrecked. 
Information from captives 
After the Tjumbok fortress at Lam Meulo fell on 13 
January, and the People's Forces occupied the town of Lam Meulo, 
the majority of the Tjumbok party's soldiers surrendered, while 
those who had sided with Tjumbok were detained for the meantime 
and taken to Garut to be investigated. After these prisoners 
were arrested and each gave clear information about the position 
of the Tjumbok party, they were freed again and the Markas Rakjat 
trusted in their civic consciousness in this time of independence. 
Among other things, the prisoners related how harsh and 
cruel the Tjumbok party was in torturing members of the People's 
Forces, especially ulamas, who had been taken captive . During 
interrogation, they were hit, little pieces of their body were 
chopped off, and after they had had enough of this sort of torture, 
they were buried alive. An even more despicable cruelty, when it 
was clear that those who were captured were leaders in the popular 
movement, was to cut a piece of their thigh and throw it as food 
for the big dogs of Teuku Daud Tjumbok .... until the dogs seemed 
to have eaten enough of the flesh of men. 
Indeed
1
for some time past,Teuku Daud Tjwnbok had kept two 
dogs as big as wild tigers in his house. The expenses of these 
precious dogs were greater than the expenses of the entire house-
hold of an ordinary family. If he thought anybody had not carried 
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out his will as he had been ordered, these two big dogs were told 
to attack that person, in place of a sentence of imprisonment .. • (35) 
Is there cruelty greater than this on the face of the 
earth? 
Teuku Oaud Tjtunbok surrenders 
After the Lam Meulo fortress fell on the date mentioned 
above, Teuku Daud Tjumbok fled together with some members of his 
staff and his family except for the women. The people followed 
and pursued the fleeing traitors as far as the mountains and second-
ary forest. After making his way through this secondary forest for 
three days, with irregular food and sleep, Teuku Daud Tjumbok 
finally surrendered on 16 January to a unit of the People's Forces 
which was looking for him in one of the valleys· of Gunung Seulawah, 
not very far from the place where the train stops . 
Besides Teuku Daud Tjumbok, others arrested on the same 
day were Teuku Hasan (his son), T. Anwar (the son of T .M. Hasan . 
Glumpang Pajung), Teuku Muhamad Ie Labeue, and 12 of their other 
friends. After they surrendered they were taken by train to Sigli. 
At Sigli the people asked that T. Daud Tjumbok shout 'Merdeka' 
three times . Then he was taken to Garut, to be investigated as to 
all the reasons for his despicable acts. 
The Task of Reconstruction in Pidie 
With the destruction of the Tjumbok party's defensive 
fortress at Lam Meulo and the capture of Teuku Daud Tjumbok himself, 
the duty of the people of Pidie region to wipe out the group of 
traitors to the Fatherland was fulfilled. The struggle in the form 
of an armed contest is finished, and now the whole people as citizens 
of a free Republic of Indonesia must enter another field of struggle, 
namely the arena of the new struggle to reestablish peace and order 
for the ordinary people of Pidie region who are no longer certain 
what will become of them because of the consequences of the very 
cruel war. (36) 
The people's intention and desire to make a clean sweep of 
all those who sided with the ~tch and their followers has already 
been carried out, by means of all kinds of sacrifice. Now around 
the Pidie region we see hundreds of inhabitants who no longer have 
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a home because of the cruelty of Tjumbok in carrying out his scorched· 
earth policy, to the point where in more than one village the inhabi-
tants stay together in one house or in sura:u (prayer-halls) which 
escaped the burnings. How many children have . lost their parents, how 
many yo~n.g women have been widowed, how many people suffer hunger, 
how many, yes, how many ... things which we have not the heart to 
write about. All of this is the result of the cruelty and wickedness 
of the Tjumbok Party and all those of the same opinion as that 
traitor to the Fatherland. 
In the work of wiping out the lice who betrayed the Father-
land in Horth Atjeh and around the Pidie region, we must truly express 
great gratitude for the services of the pemudas who struggled in the 
fight against the Tjwnbok traitor, especially for the pemudas who 
died as noble victims of the struggle, and subsequently also for the 
services of the pemudas who are now continuing the work o~ building 
a new order in all the affairs of North Atjeh. 
The effort and sacrifice which must be made by the pemudas 
in the work of reconstruction in the region which has seen so many 
incidents is very great indeed, because the matters which must be 
settled will demand assistance of various kinds - mind, strength 
soul, and property. To settle all these affairs in a short time is 
a heavy task, but the pemudas of North Atjeh never complain in 
meeting acute difficulties, because from times past they have had 
their fill of oppression and suffering. 
The way in which the pemudas of North Atjeh have already 
marshalled their forces in this new era gives rise to glittering 
hopes for the prosperity and security of the ordinary people through-
out North Atjeh, and we believe that the tyranny which has always 
held the people down will not occur again in.. North Atjeh, or indeed 
in the whole of Atjeh. 
Conclusion 
If we now look around the Pidie area after that terrible 
affair is over, we will see changes as great as day changing to 
night, as regards the defense of the state and so forth. The large 
houses which were formerly only used as places of pleasure .for the 
aristocracy have now became headquarters of the People's forces and 
places used for the general good. This is only proper, for these 
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houses and other buildings could only be built in such a beautiful 
and luxurious manner through exploiting the property and manpower 
of the ordinary people. 
One evening,just as twilight was closing,! was walking 
about in Lam Meulo (~ow Kota Bakti) (~7) together with some friends 
and comrades in arms. This was two days after the forces of the 
Tjumbok traitor had been defeated. To the right and left of us we 
could see nothing but the former luxurious places of those tyrannous 
aristocrats. Wherever we looked, there was only silence and 
desolation. The large, lofty houses seemed as though occupied by 
devils and spirits, which had just been defeated . Our hair stood 
on end as we went inside. The general atmosphere made you want to 
scream. 
Thus the wheel of the universe turns, g1v1ng rise to 
various ·events both horrifying and joyful. Nevertheless, once his 
time has come, no man can escape his fate. Even so with the aristo-
cracy of North Atjeh1 whose time for living tyrannously had truly run 
out. Willing or unwilling, they had to bow before the law of life . 
and the will of the times, bringing their destiny towards its ruin. 
We.may see the sensational Tjwnbok affair as the first shot 
in the eruption of the Social Revolution in Atjeh, and even through-
out Sumatra. (38) Now the tyrannical feudal group is altogether 
crushed, but we cannot allow the condition of society to remain 
simply in a state of disorganisation. Let us rather reorganise as 
quickly as possible, until we are able to bring prosperity to a 
society living in peace and tranquillity. 
God will support our endeavours! 
I . 
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NOTES TO TEXT 
1. Pidie is the name both of an historic region centred around 
the irrigated area behind Sigli but often regarded as extending 
as far east as Peusangan and of a powerful nang~ou (to use 
the word preferred by James Siegel for what the Dutch called 
uZeebaZangsahap (the territory governed by an uleebalang) in 
the inunediate vicinity of Sigli. The three districts (Dutch 
onderafdeZing, the sphere of a aontroZeur under the Dutch and 
a guntjo under the Japanese) of Sigli, Lam Meulo, and 
Meureudu are generally considered Pidie region proper, and 
were constituted a separate l<abupaten in 1946. Until then, 
i1owever , they comprised part of the Kabupaten (Dutch afdeling, 
the sphere of an assistant-resident) of North Atjeh, with 
its capital at Sigli but its eastern boundary at Diamond Point. 
This accounts for the writer's use, sometimes interchangeably, 
of the term Pidie and North Atjeh to describe the scene ·of 
conflic.t. 
2. A gross exaggeration, significantly included only in this 
Preface written in April, after the widespread killing of 
Pidie uleebalangs . In fact there were a few strongly Republican 
uleebalangs, and a much larger group who wanted to avoid burning 
their boats with either side, but were eventually forced into 
Tjurnbok's camp by the growing polarisation in the region. The 
first meeting of Pidie uleebalangs, on 22 October, agreed that 
they had no quarrel with the Republic provided their (pre-war?) 
prerogatives were respected, and they later sent a telegram 
to this effect to Sukarno. Semangat Merdeka 14 January 1946. 
Interviews. Ismail Jakoeb's interrogation of Djaoh Ahmad 
16 January 1946. For the last-mentioned source, and for much 
other help, I am indebted to James Siegel. 
3. Although my holdings of Semangat Merdeka include only 9 of the 
13 instalments, those agree verbatim with the later pamphlet. 
The only changes in the pamphlet appear to be the addition of 
this Preface, and of the Conclusion given below in place of 
a shorter conclusion in the original. 
4. The B.P.I. (Badan Pemuda Indonesia - Indonesian Youth Group) 
was formed on 6 October, and became P.R.!. (Pemuda Republik 
Indonesia) on 17 October and Pesindo on 10 December. The B.P . I . 
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was preceded by an informal grouping known as Ikatan Pemuda 
Indonesia centred around the Atjeh Sinbun staff. Aly Hasjmy, 
editor of Atjeh Sinbun, headed all these organisations, whose 
change.s of name followed the practice of Medan pemudas, who 
in turn were anxious to keep in step with Java. 
Abdullah has condensed events somewhat here. The Merah-Putih 
was not widely flown until after October 12. 
5. Presumably mid-October. Semangat Merdeka began publication 
on 18 October. 
6. Teuku Muhamad Daud, uleebalang of Tjumbok, was the dominating 
figure of the Lam Meulo onderafdeling, not only because 
Tjumbok was the only sizeable nanggrou in the district, and 
embraced the town of Lam Maulo, but also because of his 
personal energy. A.J. Piekaar, Atjeh en de Oorlog met Japan, 
(The Hague/Bandung, 1949), p.129, says of him, 'A forceful 
and energetic personality, uncompromising and domineering, 
he was a typical representative of the younger generation ~f 
Atjeh's noble families'. The Dutch entrusted the whole 
onderafdeling to him in 1942 when they withdrew before the 
advancing Japanese. The Japanese also made use of him, from 
late 1942 until the end of the occupation, as Guntjo 
(controleur) of Lam Maulo. 
7: The largest P.R.I. procession and flag-raising ceremony in 
Lam Maulo appears to have been on 5 November. Semangat 
Merdeka, l O November 1945 . 
8. The Guntjos (controleurs, or district officers) of the 
Japanese regime were simply recognised as officials of the 
Republic by the first Republican Resident, T. Njak Arif, 
though their official title was changed to Kapala Wilajah. 
All were of uleebalang families. 
9. Many former officials, not only in Atjeh, made con.tact with 
their former Dutch superiors in the Rantau Prapat detention 
camp following the surrender, either out of genuine sympathy 
with the plight of the detainees, or anxiety to make amends 
for cooperating with. the Japanese. Daud Tjumbok was the first 
of many Atjehnese uleebalangs to send an eT'J)lor to the camp, 
on.ls. September ~945. 'Yerslag van de gebeurtenissen, in de 
Afdeling Pidie', (.cited p • .30 above), p.2. 
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10. Tentera Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Army), the then 
title of the Republican Army, .the embryo of which had been 
fo~ed in Atjeh on 12 October from those trained by. the 
Japanese. There were several members of uleebalang families 
among the higher officers, because these had been among the 
first to obtain officer training from the Japanese. In Pidie 
several such officers eventually sided with. Tjumbok, and took 
some of their men with them. 
11. This may be a correct description of the immediate consequences 
of the first shots fired, but it gives a misleading impression 
about the preparedness of at least a substantial group on the 
P.R.!. side. Some of the more militant P.R. I. units had sub-
stantial Japanese arms including machine guns and were very 
anxious for a showdown with the uleebalangs whom they had 
effectively surrounded in Sigli . 
12. Pre-war Pemuda Pusa and post-war P.R.I. leader in Peudaja. He 
had been leading the contingent from Padang Tidji. 
13. This date appears to conflict with the 'November, 1945' date 
on the SPK document reproduced on the following page . The 
probability is that Tjumbok formed his B.P . K. in November, but 
persuaded the other uleebalangs to extend it throughout Pidie 
at the 10 December meeting . 
14. Uleebalang of Ndjong, described by Piekaar (9p. cit., p . 83) 
as •one of the most intelligent, most civilised, and most 
loyal rulers'. 
15. The description of the tasks of these B.P.K. units became more 
elaborate with each retelling by anti-Tjumbok writers. The 
earliest reference in Seroangat Merdeka, -17 January 1946, already 
described the Tjap Bintang (~ed by the ex KNIL soldier Putih) as 
the 'fighting unit'; the Tjap Sauh as the 'plundering unit'; 
and the Tjap Tombak as the 'unit to hunt for women and girls 
to be raped ' . 
16. Teungku Tjhik Umar di Tiro (see also p. 47) was highly respec-
ted as the grandson of Teungku Tjhik di Tiro (J836-91) , and 
the leading surviving ..member of a iamily that had led the 
guerrilla resistance to the Dutch from the 1880s until 19.11 . 
Umar himself was captured in 1910., at the age of 6, when his 
father was killed by Dutch troops, and was not freed until 1914. 
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Alth~gh he had a traditional reliBious education he did not 
become a rel_igious teach.er, and his role in or$anisations 
such as PUSA was always a primarily s)'lllbolic one . The pre-
ced~ng reference .is. presumably to Hasan Muhamad Tiro, nephew 
of Tetl;Ilgku Umar, who became Darul Islam representatiYe in 
New York and author of Demokrasi Untuk Indonesia (J.958?) and 
other works . 
.17. IJnewn (derived £rom Arabic Imam) is the head of a mukim 
(parish, comprising several villages) and Keutjhik the head 
of a Yillage. Both were secular officials responsible to 
the uleebalang. 
18 . The KaZi (Arabic Kadi) or Islamic judge, was in pre-war times1 
an official appointed by and responsible to the uleebalang 
for the administration of Islamic law in the nanggrou. He 
was therefore often in.rivalry with the .more charismatic 
influence of the independent religious teacher, or ulama. 
19. Garut, probably because of its proximity to the Dutch admin- . 
istrative centre of Sigli, was an important centre for small 
Atjehnese traders and for anti-Dutch sentiment since the late 
19th Century. In particular, it was the home of such PUSA 
stalwarts as Hasan Aly, Peutua Husin, and T.M. Amin . 
Piekaar, op. cit., p.84 . 
20. · Dutch sources ascribed the failure of the attack on Garut to 
the inveterate weakness and indecision of the uleebalang of 
Samaindra Teuku Ma'ali. 'Verslag van de gebeurtanisaan in 
de Afdeling Pidie', p.13; Piekaar, op. cit., p . 84. 
21 . teuku Tjhik Muhammad Said as uleebalang of Tjunda had been 
one of a group of progressive uleebalangs in Lhokseumawe 
region who were arrested in the early 1920s because of their 
association with Sar~kat Islam. Muhammad Said was exiled in 
T.i.Dlo:r until the ~apan.ese occupation. H.e was Guntjo of 
Kutaradja from August ,1944 until 10 December, .1945, when the 
Sumatran Governor Teuku Hasan appointed him Assistant-
Resident of No.rth Atjeh, in the vain hope that his . credentials 
as an indisputably nationalist uleebalang .might enable him 
to overcome the polarisation in Pidie . 
22. The other specific grievance the PUSA group had against 
Muhanmad Said was his apparent assistance in enabling the last 
Japanese troops to avacuate Sigli by ship on 20 December, where-
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as the P.R.!. militants had wanted at least to force them 
to give their remaining weapons. But his failure was 
primarily a testimony to the inability of the 'official' 
Republic to prevent the clash which had by. then become 
inevitable. Muhammad Said was seized in Sigli after the 
fall of Lam Meulo, and killed soon thereafter. 
23. Revolusi December '45 di Atjeh, p. 25, dates the establish-
ment of the Pusat Markas Barisan Rakjat at 22 December. 
However, as leader of the P.R. I. for Pidie, Hasan Aly of 
Garut was already coordinating action to same extent .much 
earlier. 
24. Hasan Aly (b. 1916) was educated at the Sigli H.I.S. (Dutch 
primary school), and was active in the late 1930s as a 
small trader, an agent in legal cases, and a youth leader. 
From 1937-40 he was a correspondent of various Medan papers, 
and wrote several articles critical of the uleebalangs. In 
1940 he was acquitted on a charge of conspiring against the 
government, while his colleagues Peutua Husin and Djohan 
Alunad were convicted and imprisoned. During the Japanese 
occupation he joined the judiciary, becoming Simparl{Jkan 
(judge) in Kutaradja in 1944. About October 6, 1945, he 
was appointed head of the Sigli branch of B.P.I. (later 
P.R.I.) and in this capacity was the principal coordinator 
of the ensuing struggle against the uleebalangs. After it 
was over he was appointed an assistant to the new Assistant-
Resident, Tgk. Abdul Wahab (Seulimeum), with the rank of 
koptaliP (controleur). 
25. Secretary of PUSA. 
26. A. Arify was a pen-name of Abdullah Arif. 
27 . Literally, local court. The judiciary (Japanese Ho-in was a 
particularly critical issue, as the uleebalangs had controlled 
both the lower civil and religious courts under the Dutch. 
The Japanese removed the former in 1943, and the latter in 
1944, establishing distinct judicial services with mixed com-
position in the case of the civil courts, but PUSA domination 
in the case of the Islamic court system (~apanese Shukyo-ho-
in). After the Japanese surrender, sons of the Jllore aggressive 
Pidie uleebalangs such as Tjumbok attempted to resume their 
pre-war powers immediately, but were opposed by the new 
occupants of judicial positions. 
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28. Revolusi December '45 di Atjeh, p. 25, puts this on 20 
December, but Abdullah's sequence seems more probable. 
29. The Markas UmLUll (general headquarters) appears to have been 
fonned in late November, under the leadership of T.K.R. 
connnander Col. Sjammaun Gaharu, to coordinate the activity 
of military, police, and the principal bodies of Zasjkar.>s 
(politically-based fighting youth groups) under the leader-
ship of P.R.I. and Daud Beureu'eh respectively. 
30. The Polisi Istemewa. (special police) were an elite anned 
unit of about 200 ex-KNIL soldiers fonned by the Resident, 
T. Njak Arif. They aroused sane suspicion in the anti-
uleebalang camp, and were incorporated into the T.K.R. after 
Njak Arif's fall. 
31. The first Resident of Atjeh, the prominent pre-war nation-
alist and Volksraad member Teuku Njak Arif, went on sick 
leave on 14 December. He was indeed suffering from 
diabetes, from which he died 5 months later, but an additional 
reason was the feeling of some of the other Atjeh leaders 
that he was dangerously uncompromising, in his opposition to 
the remaining Japanese troops on the one hand, and the more 
extreme P.R.I. elements on the other. T. Tjhik Muhammad 
Daudsjah, uleebalang of Idi and Republican Assistant Resident 
of East Atjeh was named Acting Resident but declined to take 
~p his post immediately. Teuku Panglima Polem Muhanunad Ali, 
hereditary chief of the Sagi of the XXII Mukims (Seulimewn 
area) therefore filled in during this crit~cal period, though 
what real power government organs possessed resided rather in 
the Komite Nasional and the Markas lbnum. 
32. The Madjlis Islam Tinggi (Supreme Islamic Council) or M.I.T. 
was begun in West Sumatra and extended to other parts of 
Sumatra in the last months of the Japanese r~gime as a belated 
attempt to rally and unify Islamic forces in the fashion of 
MasjLUlli in Java. · The M.I.T. was brought back to life in the 
all-Sumatra Conference of 7 December which declared it to be 
a political party and elected officers. Tgk. Abdul Wahab, 
a prominent ulama and PUSA leader from Seulimeum, was elected 
to head the anned force of the M.I.T., known as the Barisan 
SabiliZZah. Among the resolutions passed at the Conference 
was a warning to 'traitorsi: "if they do not change their 
attitude and their actions, then blood will be pennitted, 
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meaning they may be killed". Osman Raliby, Documenta 
Historica, (Djakarta, 1953), pp. 136-7). In March,1946 
M.I.T. merged with Masjumi. 
33. · A graduate from Cairo's Al-Aznar, El Ibrahimy was the 
principal of the Sekolah Normal Islam founded by PUSA at 
Bireuen, which had helped make Bireuen a centre for Pemuda 
PUSA. A large quantity of Japanese arms had been captured 
in Bireuen in late November and in the following month 
were taken from the Guntjo of Bireuen by the P.R.I. group 
there. The anti-uleebalang force from Bireuen was there-
fore well-armed, and competently commanded by Hasballah (of 
Trianggading, n·ot to be confused with the Hasbal lah Daud 
ment1oned on p. 47), a PUSA supporter who had the benefit 
of Japanese officer training. 
34 . Meureudu,Lueng Putu, and Beureunun, the seats of the 
relatively powerful uleebalangs of Meureudu, Ndjong, and 
Keumangan respectively, lay along the main trunk road from 
Bireuen to Sigli or Lam Meulo (see map). This force from 
Bireuen was the first to draw uleebalang blood. The most 
severe fighting before Lam Meulo itself was at Lueng Putu, 
and the death of T. Laksamana Oemar was already reported on 
3 December . Beureunun was close to Lam Meulo, and was 
separately fortified by the uleebalangs mainly because the 
traditional hostility between Keumangan and Tjumbok made 
closer cooperation impossible. The Teuku Keumangan referred 
to here is probably Oemar, known even to the Dutch as parti-
cularly rapacious and replaced by his son in 1938 on the 
accusation of extortion. He was a personal enemy of Tgk • 
. Daud Beureu~eh, and appears to have taken a prominent role 
in Pidie after the Japanese surrender. 'Nagekomen Mededel-
ingen betreffende het "Tjoembo-Conflict"', 25 February 1946, 
Bin~enlandse Zaken 21/1; Semangat Merdeka 10 January, 1946; 
interviews. 
·35 , The Muslim aversion to dogs, to which Atjeh was certainly no 
exception, would of itself be conducive to exaggerations of 
this sort . 
36. Under the circumstances when these connnents were first 
published (6 Februarr,1946), they appear to constitute a 
call for moderation. Despite instructions to the contrary 
from the Government in Kutaradja, the members of uleebalang 
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families captured in the fighting were killed in Garut 
during late January and early February, while others 
who had taken no part were also killed. A partial list 
of victims, with 48 names including those of most of the 
14 uleebalangs of Sigli onderafdeling, is appended to 
'~agekomen Mededelingen', loc. cit .. 
37 . Lam Meulo was renamed Kota Ba.kti (bastion of loyalty) in 
honour of the fighting there. 
38. During late February and early March a force from East 
Atjeh under Tgk. Hussein al-Mudjahid arrested (but di d not 
kill) most of the uleebalangs in North and East Atjeh. 
Probably influenced by. some ill-digested Marxism operating 
through the veteran !di conununist Nathar Zainuddin, they 
seem to have portrayed the operation as in part a 'social 
revolution'. The more explicit 'social revolution' 
against the Sultans and radjas of East Sumatra began on 
5 March. 
